An article was previously published on the RedMed website on how the great change in Syria, which may be expected to shake the whole of Western Asia (the Middle East), came about, what forces prepared the ground for this change, why Assad's Baathist regime collapsed, and what role various external forces played in the victory of HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham - the Great Syria Liberation Organization) and SNA (the Syrian National Army, i.e. the Syrian army under the command of the Erdoğan government). The main thrust of that article was to understand the dynamics behind the collapse of the Baathist regime, which took everyone by surprise, and to gauge the depth of change that this would bring about across Western Asia.
The task now is to try to grasp the new dynamics emerging in the context of Syria, Turkey and Western Asia in general, taking into account the developments of the last month or so since December 8, and thus to foresee the prospects of the coming period as clearly as possible.
Of course, prospects cannot be reduced to a single scenario. The reader will see below that the future of Syria can be analyzed on the basis of at least two main scenarios: a form of development in which Syria is unified as a single state under the auspices of the imperialist system, with Turkey at the forefront, by a regime that disguises itself and its long-term goals, which we can characterize as “coat-and-tie takfirism". The alternative is a Libya-like scenario in which HTS as well as Turkey behind it are unable to control the various forces in Syria, and cannot reach a full agreement with imperialism, leaving the country fragmented between warlords of different tendencies.
These two scenarios will of course have very different consequences. Turkey will try to play the role of the HTS’ overlord in both scenarios. But the consequences of these two scenarios for Syria, Turkey and the entire region of Western Asia will be very different.
So let us examine these two scenarios and their consequences in a cold-blooded manner. After this analysis, let us go on to examine the implications of the new situation for the Kurdish question. Finally, let us try to predict what the Syrian earthquake will mean for the main forces that have been active in the region so far.
The two different scenarios of analysis will mainly focus on how Syria and Turkey (and thus the Kurdish people and the Kurdish movement) will be affected by this development in the coming period. The final section will focus on other forces active in the region, from Israel, Russia and Iran to Hezbollah and Iraq.
Syria as Turkey's new Cyprus
In Tayyip Erdoğan's political strategy, which we have called Rabiism, it had always been central to establish a zone of influence in Western Asia and North Africa (in the region traditionally called MENA) and beyond that in the Muslim-majority countries of Africa, thereby developing the Turkish bourgeoisie's oil and natural gas supply, foreign trade and foreign investments, its dominance over these countries, and ultimately realizing a mission that could lead to the re-establishment of the caliphate around the idea of the "ummah". However, the great upheaval caused by the popular uprising that started with Gezi and the Bonapartist coup in Egypt in 2013 upset this strategic orientation. The Syrian regime's protection by Iran and (from 2015 onwards) by Russia made the first fortress to prove to be extremely resilient and set the stage for a long, long process of dying away. The narrative that the Baath regime "collapsed quickly", that it "fell in 13 days" is very common and extremely startling. From March 15, 2011 to December 8, 2024, over a period of more than 13 years, the Baath regime survived despite being attacked from all sides by the US, Britain, and some of the most powerful and richest states in Western Asia (most notably Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Erdoğan's Turkey). It did not resist destruction for 13 days; it resisted for 13 years. What is surprising is something else: The sudden collapse of the regime that seemed to have won the "civil" war precisely in the context of this success. If this analysis of the "sudden collapse" is understood in its proper sense, it becomes clear how important the role played by Israel and Turkey has been, each in its own way. The former by paralyzing Hezbollah, and the latter by steadfastly maintaining the HTS and SNA trump cards since 2016 despite the regime's appearance of victory, each played a crucial role in the Baath's collapse.
As a result of this perseverance, Erdoğan is well on his way to adding his first colony to Turkish territory. If this process is successfully completed, Turkey will have a second colony outside its borders after Northern Cyprus. In the context of the reactionary and nationalist ideological atmosphere that prevails in 21st-century Turkey, it can be predicted that this will give Erdoğan new prestige in the eyes of the masses of the people and that his declining reputation will recover with even a leap forward. Erdoğan has become the "king-maker" in Syria. He has brought an entire country and a dictatorship that lasted more than half a century to its knees. He has become the sword of Islam, paving the way for Sunni Islam in secular Syria. After Ecevit, the "Conqueror of Cyprus", we will hear much talk of Erdoğan, the "Conqueror of Syria". Erdoğan has won the first victory for "Rabiism". It is true that the force he is leaning on is not al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) which was conceived as the basis of Rabiism, but an armed movement of "coat-and-tie takfirists". But it has succeeded in gaining a great deal of influence in the Arab world, and in a neighboring country at that. Of course, Erdoğan did not achieve all this on his own. On the contrary, all these achievements are largely the work of his imperialist patrons, who cook everything in the kitchen but prefer to stay behind the scenes, preferring to conduct their affairs in the Islamic world with a "Muslim" proxy, most notably British imperialism, which since July 15, 2016 has developed a very special relationship with the despotic regime headed by Erdoğan and his ally Devlet Bahçeli. As long as Erdoğan stays within the limits they have drawn and as long as he is the one holding the hot potato in the fire engulfing Western Asia, the imperialists will not be bothered by him playing the role of "conqueror" in Turkey, "caliph" in the Islamic world and "mujahid who defies the West and Israel" in the eyes of the Arab world in a way that reeks of British PR work.
The last remnants of the already degenerated Arab bourgeois revolution in Syria will be swept away and destroyed in the process. Turkey is faced with the task of ruling from behind the scenes a country marked by a takfirism that will limit itself to tactical considerations (not to openly contradict Western imperialism). The first steps of Erdoğan's dreams of the ummah and caliphate are being realized. If he can bring HTS under his complete control, Erdoğan will rule a second country of the ummah, albeit unofficially. Turkey's famously long 911-kilometer border with Syria now exists only officially, not substantially. This will have many dire consequences for Turkish society.
The first grave consequence that directly concerns Turkish society is, of course, the future of the sectarian community known as Alawites in Turkey and Nusairis in Syria. The Syrian Baathist regime was ruled by an Alawite stratum which, within a secular framework, was a barricade against the oppression of minorities by the Sunni Muslim majority. This had led to the accumulation of anger in various political movements, ranging from the Ikhwan to the takfirists, stemming from the Sunni Muslim milieu. There is now a serious possibility that various armed groups, under the supervision of the tie-and-coat takfiri leadership, will launch massive attacks on the Christians, the Druze, the Armenians and other minority groups, especially the Alawites, and the attempts after December 8, under the guise of a "hunt for Assad's commanders" against Alawite communities in the Mediterranean coastal areas of Latakia and Tartous, have proved how tangible this possibility is. It can be expected that such a possible massacre aiming at the Nusairies/Alawites would provoke outrage among the Alevis of Turkey, who have relatives in Syria, and moreover, it would lead to attacks by the Sunni majority against Alevis there as well. It would not be surprising if the fascist gangs that played a major role in the Maraş massacres of 1978 and the Çorum massacres of 1980 and many other similar incidents take sides in these developments. The self-defense of the Alevis, which found its greatest expression in the popular revolt of Gezi, will be of great importance in the coming period.
Religious fraternities and sects will engage in missionary activity in Syria. Turkish Islamism will gain an international status and the sects will have the opportunity to regain the status they enjoyed during the Ottoman period. They will gain new followers, and although at first they will have to bear a great economic burden, in time they will also enjoy pecuniary gain from their activities in Syria. It is to be expected that sects like Menzil, which is based close to Syria (primarily in Adıyaman, in southeastern Turkey), will set their eyes on the biggest share. Gaining new Arab followers in Syria will create a favorable environment for infiltration into other Arab countries. The sects' prestige and socio-economic power will grow exponentially. The "dervish" model, which played an important role in early Ottoman expansion, especially in the Balkans, could serve as a model for the conquest of Syria. However, there are many ambiguities and uncertainties regarding how this Turkish-Islamist missionary model will be received by HTS, which comes from a Salafi tradition that denounces the Islamic understanding of most of the congregations and sects in Turkey, and what the political consequences of the spread of Turkish-Islamist missionary work among the population in HTS-dominated Syria will be. As Turkey will be trying to export its own conception of Islam to Syria, it is equally possible that the environment created by Turkey's close cooperation with HTS will increase the influence of Salafist movements in Turkey itself.
After this successful offensive, Turkey could become the center of attention in Western Asia and Africa. Its rival Russia, which has so far been stronger in Africa, will lose prestige if it fails to protect its bases in Syria, as it will suffer a serious blow in terms of its access to Africa, and as it will be exposed regarding its inability to support the countries that put their faith in it. Thus, Turkey's chances in Africa will increase even more in the context of this setback suffered by Russia, which up until now has been the foremost beneficiary due to the loss of prestige of the imperialist countries in that part of the world, especially the Sahel region. If Russia's efforts to shift its military bases in Syria to Libya’s territory under the rule of Khalifa Haftar materializes, there is a possibility that Turkey and Russia will confront each other on the Libyan front this time. Turkey and Russia, who have been rivals in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, especially during the period of the decline of French imperialism, may become adversaries in this process.
The "Asrika" project of SADAT [most easily described as the Turkish Wagner], which should be interpreted as Turkish hegemony over Asia and Africa, will have made a first breakthrough, and this organization will have the opportunity to become increasingly active and influential. The international conjuncture is also becoming quite favorable for SADAT. The PR campaign launched by British imperialism through its official state agency, the BBC, to transform the terrorist-listed HTS into a liberation organization is gradually expanding. Structures such as the Turkistan Islamic Party are also getting their share of the whitewashing campaign through the foreign fighters HTS has assigned to senior positions in the new Syrian army it is building. Syria is gradually turning into a platform where takfirist-sectarian organizations will export militants for guerrilla warfare against Russia and China under the auspices of Western imperialism. No matter how useful these organizations may be for imperialism, they are ultimately unreliable structures, as the example of the Taliban used by the US against the Soviets shows. In such an environment, it is possible to foresee that Sadat, given its structure intertwined with the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK in its Turkish abbreviation), itself the only NATO army in the region, will have enormous windows of opportunity open up before it.
The rift between Turkey and the US, which has widened since ISIS became a force to be reckoned with in the region, may finally be repaired through a rapprochement. With Trump in the White House, this possibility will become even more likely. In our previous article titled “The Great Earthquake in Western Asia”, we mentioned the possibility that the US, in addition to Israel and Turkey, may have been involved in the HTS victory. There is no definite information on this yet. If all the plans and preparations were made as a trilateral initiative (US-Israel-Turkey), then this means that a closeness has already been established. The US attitude towards HTS seems to be much more cautious than that of Britain, which seems to be much more involved in the preparations for HTS's major offensive. Israel, on the other hand, has not adopted this organization as a proxy, although it has turned the HTS offensive into an opportunity to occupy strategic positions on Syrian territory. It has also carried out an intensive bombardment to prevent HTS from using the military infrastructure left over from the Baathist regime and has tried to limit the possibility of this organization acting autonomously from its imperialist patrons by defanging it. Despite all these contradictions, the new structure in Syria, with HTS at its center, has brought together the US and Israel in the region in order to roll back Iran, the main enemy in the region and the main rival for Turkey's Rabiist foreign policy. Unlike his predecessor, Trump tends to pursue a policy that favors American interests from a greater distance by opening space for allies in Syria. Trump seems to prefer a scenario in which a NATO corridor in the north of Syria, with forces from the Turkish Armed Forces and its offshoot, the SNA, and a corridor in the south, controlled by proxy FSA forces directly trained and equipped by the US at its al-Tanf base, stretching from the Golan to the Iraqi border, under the supervision of Israel, the PYD/YPG in the east of the Euphrates serves as a gendarme for its oil wells and a warden for the prisons in which ISIS militants are kept, while the rest of Syria is abandoned to coat-and-tie takfirism with its teeth removed. While the process leading to this scenario will bring about a warming of relations and a serious rapprochement between Turkey and the United States, it can be predicted that Turkey's policy of equilibrium using its relations with Russia and China as a counter-balance against excessive dependence on the US will weaken in favor of the West.
The issue of “Syrians” [i.e. the more than 3.5 million immigrants according to official figures] in Turkey is a double-edged sword. For Erdoğan, the forced expulsion of Syrians from their environment is unacceptable. Syrians are now his direct voters. Erdoğan sees them as a vote bank against his opponents when they stay in Turkey and as potential agents of his influence over Syria when they return to Syria. The time has come for Erdoğan to reap the fruits of his immigration policy, which he has carried out at great financial and political cost and risk. In return, the Victory Party [a latter-day rather small fascist party] has even more arguments to expel Syrians. It will push harder than before on the grounds that "the war is over, Assad is gone". It is highly likely that the CHP will also try to play this trump card. In other words, the "Syrians" will become an even more topical issue.
Turkish real estate investment trusts and, more generally, developer capitalists are the world's best candidates for a stake in Syria's "reconstruction". If the U.S. is able to extract ample financing from the United Nations or consortia of rich countries, Turkish capital and the economy could embark on a serious growth spurt. In a recent interview with Bloomberg TV, Sani Şener, the chief executive of TAV, the airport operating company, said out of the blue, even though he was not asked about it, "Now look, there is the Syria thing. We study Syria like crazy, we follow Syria like crazy", confirming this observation. Banks will make an intense effort to finance this reconstruction activity in order to loot Syria. Exporters are standing by to sell goods to Syria as soon as the country's economy recovers. Erdoğan expressed hope years ago that the Turkish lira would become the main currency within the borders of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, but this has not happened. But it should come as no surprise if the "Syrian lira" (also known as the "Syrian pound") is soon replaced (unofficially, of course) by the Turkish lira.
The way has been cleared for Erdoğan and the entire Turkish bourgeoisie to push for Turkey's share of the revenues from the natural gas deposits under the Mediterranean Sea. If a new environment is created in Syria on the Kurdish question, the Kirkuk oil can be added to this if there is a tendency in the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq to warm up to Turkey. Syria has the potential to create important regional opportunities for Turkish capitalism in addition to its own economic advantages.
The Turkish Armed Forces and the National Police will contribute to the consolidation of the colonial relationship by training, equipping and providing operational guidance to the security forces of the new "Emirate".
The SNA has proven its usefulness to Erdoğan as a second army. After this, Erdoğan may finally decide to create a second army, like the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, that is much more loyal to him than the SNA. It would be delusional to expect HTS to agree to the SNA forming the backbone of the new Syrian army. HTS is an armed movement. Therefore, the SNA can function as an "Erdoğan army" both in Syria, as a subsidiary force, and Turkey. Of course, the SNA should not be expected to be visible within the borders of Turkey beyond the NATO corridor in northern Syria, except for its training activities in some Turkish army barracks. However, in any major political crisis, it should never be ruled out that this army could march into the center of the country to crush Erdoğan's opponents, possibly (and certainly in the event of a civil war) as the "Action Army" like the one that crushed the reactionary March 31 uprising against the Revolution of Liberty back in 1909, but this time of a counter-revolutionary character.
From success to nightmare: the prospect of a regime of warlords, disintegration, perpetual state of war
The new Syria has contradictions that will not be easy to overcome. Foremost among these is the deep contradiction between the ideological character of HTS and the alliance that enabled it to come to power.
For Israel, HTS is not the first radical Islamist organization it has played against a secular opponent. It is no secret that Israel supported Hamas in order to divide and weaken the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) but later regretted it. The same will be true when HTS is played against the partly secular Baathist regime. HTS's Islamism does not bother the Zionists. But anti-Zionism that might ensue from Islamism, or even more anti-Semitism, or geostrategic contradictions could lead Israel to be ruthless against this new threat.
More generally, Ahmad al-Shera (nom de guerre al-Golani) and HTS could very soon lose the lustre that is currently being given it by the entire imperialist world. This could leave Erdoğan alone with HTS and isolate him again.
In such a situation, the reconstruction activity, the rearmament of Syria (Israel has left Syria toothless and clawless by destroying 350 military targets in a few days), the need for humanitarian aid etc. would be completely blocked, Syria would become a heavy burden for the Turkish bourgeoisie rather than a gain. Just like in Afghanistan, where the Taliban has become a "pariah" in the eyes of the imperialist order due to its ideological orientation and cannot even receive humanitarian aid, the new Syria will face the possibility of severe isolation. If it remains under this kind of pressure, the new Syria will be on the road to disintegration as a result of the bursting of its already existing cracks.
If there is a setback on the Kurdish question, i.e. if the Kurdish movement, represented by the combination of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian Kurdish party PYD and the People's Protection Forces (YPG), comes into conflict with forces loyal to Turkey, this would expose Erdoğan's new colony to even more serious cracks.
This crumbling could turn Syria into an ungovernable country of warlords, in the same manner as Libya. Moreover, some of these warlords could be hardline takfirists, with no coat-end-tie façade. Among the small armies accompanying HTS today are Chechens, Uighurs and other radical Islamist forces.
In such a situation, a resurgence of ISIS is possible. ISIS could reap the fruits of HTS's success, as its rival is competing in the same lane but acting much more consistently. It is impossible for HTS's shameful relations with Western imperialism not to provoke a reaction from the movement's base over time. There should be no doubt that the imperialists will demand interest for the credit they have given to HTS's rule. It is possible that ISIS or new types of radical Islamist, takfirist-sectarian movements will rise out of these contradictions. There is a big difference between these two scenarios for Erdoğan, but for Turkey's workers, laborers and oppressed (especially the Alevis), it will be a crossing between the devil and the deep blue sea.
Current and possible effects of the tremor in Syria on the Kurdish question
It is now fully understood that the earthquake in Turkish politics, based on the Devlet Bahçeli- Abdullah Öcalan dialogue, latter the historical leader of the PKK and currently imprisoned, is organically related to the great tremor in Syria. In the article "The Great Earthquakue in Western Asia", we explained how the temporal flow of the two developments was in harmony. To take up a point that was not mentioned in that article, Erdoğan's statement that Israel would set its sights on "our homeland territory" after Palestine and Lebanon because of its ideological obsession with the "Promised Land" was made on October 1, and the venue was the Parliament. Bahçeli shook the hands of the leaders of the DEM Party group [the Kurdish party] at the end of the session in which this statement was made, and sometime later he suggested that Öcalan should come to the DEM Party group in parliament and announce that he was disbanding the organization. Erdoğan's statement that Israel has become a threat to Turkish territory is of course demagoguery. But it is very likely that Erdoğan was at that point aware of the plan being discussed between Israel and the HTS to paralyze Hezbollah and overthrow Assad. Therefore, he was aware of something that those who do not possess this knowledge cannot know: Turkey and Israel will become neighbors when Turkey takes control of Syria on the basis of HTS/SNA cooperation. Today, Israel has come very close to Damascus as it has taken control of the area around to the Golan Heights.
Furthermore, in a speech he gave a week after Assad's fall, Erdoğan emphasized in very precise terms, "we will never allow division" in Syria. This means that both the aforementioned regime of warlords and the existence of Rojava will not be tolerated. How will the latter be prevented? The military way is to defeat the YPG. This can be done with the cooperation of the TSK/HTS/SNA, but for now the US is behind the YPG. The US has not raised its voice against the advance of HTS up to the Euphrates River, and has probably offered certain assurances for the PYD/YPG to withdraw its forces to the east of the Euphrates without any clashes. As a matter of fact, the US threatens HTS with economic and political sanctions if it moves east of the Euphrates and shows that it will not allow such an expansion by deploying warplanes of the anti-ISIS coalition in hot moments. It is in order to overcome this problem that Bahçeli has taken the initiative. The fact that the initiative came from Bahçeli is probably to emphasize that the MHP is not captive to Erdoğan's initiative and that it is his idea to put forward Kurdish-Turkish cooperation for the "salvation of the homeland". To do otherwise would have left Bahçeli vulnerable to accusations in the fascist community of being a stepping stone for an Erdoğan who has started cooperating with terrorism again.
The article "Great Earthquake in Western Asia" made the following prediction: "In the new Syrian situation, the fate of Rojava will not be determined militarily there, but will depend on how the Kurdish movement in Turkey responds to the offer made to it by the People's Alliance [i.e. Erdoğan and Bahçeli]." This prediction has so far been confirmed. It may be recalled that the serious tensions that arose between the SNA and the YPG in the aftermath of Assad's fall could only be stopped by an ultimatum from the US forces in Syria. But almost a month later, beyond very partial out-of-control incidents, the two sides have avoided confrontation. This is because both sides are awaiting the results of the series of talks that have begun in Turkey. Of course, confrontation between the two armed forces, which are facing each other as a result of a long history of political tension, can sometimes erupt unexpectedly, even in the face of secondary factors. But the main wind is blowing from the dialogue between Ankara and the İmrali prison where Öcalan is being kept.
At the same time, in the context of the existing discord within the Kurdish movement, the article "Great Earthquake in Western Asia" concluded, "It is clear that the new situation will strengthen the hand of those within the Kurdish movement who advocate a 'unity of the cause of Sunni Islam'". When this issue first emerged, there were credible reports in the international press (Al-Monitor Turkey) that Qandil, i.e. the extant PKK leadership, was opposed to İmralı's plans and that Öcalan had even hung up on Qandil at one stage during a phone call. Therefore, our article stated that "the talks seem to have reached an impasse for the time being" and then added: "Time will tell whether this impasse can be overcome in light of the new collective situation in Syria." Time has at least shown the following: The new collective situation in Syria has led to Qandil's silence and/or waiting in the wings or being ignored for the time being. In other words, once again, the Syrian issue and the short-term fate of the Kurdish question are completely intertwined. However, it should never be forgotten that even if an agreement is reached, certain road accidents may occur and the rough edges that seemed to be resolved at the beginning may rise as obstacles at unexpected moments.
Although it is uncertain whether it will materialize or not, it is a shallow view to attribute the new orientation, which is now at the center of the agenda with the Erdoğan-Bahçeli- Öcalan trilateral communication (the “Bahçeli-Erdoğan paradigm” in Öcalan's words), solely to Erdoğan's desire to be re-elected or solely to the search for support for a new constitution. Even if the criticism that Erdoğan "prioritizes his personal fortunes over national interests" is true, this should not be put forward in a way that obscures the fact that Turkey is undergoing a profound process of change. Moreover, Erdoğan's personal future cannot be understood independently of his Rabiism, his expansionism, his political understanding based on the ummah and his longing for a caliphate. In other words, the two are intertwined. Linking the tripartite agreement to the concern of being elected in a new election, just for the sake of short-term concerns to wear Erdoğan down, will obscure processes of historical importance. The same is almost exactly the case with the constitutional issue. All three issues are deeply interconnected.
Today's attempt at a tripartite agreement is a direct step towards the implementation of the Second Republic orientation put forward by Turgut Özal in 1993 in today's different conditions. The strategy of bringing the Kurds of the other three parts under Turkey's influence through an alliance with the Kurds of Turkey, which is the essence of the Second Republic program, is the main goal of today's orientation. As we mentioned above, the negotiations being carried out today to make the YPG a part of Turkey's orientation will tomorrow be used to gradually detach the Kurdistan Regional Government from Iraq and bring it under Turkey's sphere of influence. More importantly, a plan to cut off the Iranian Kurds from that country and bring them under Turkey's influence the day after tomorrow is also part of this general orientation. In relation to this last point, a similar plan to exert a similar influence on the Azeri minority of Iran through Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation is a twin of this plan. Anyone who does not see the fingerprints of America and Israel behind all this does not understand Özal, nor the ambitions of Zionism in the Middle East (Western Asia).
In the short term, the Turkish state will center its relations with the Kurdish people on cooperation with the various components of the Kurdish movement (Öcalan, Demirtaş, DEM Party and, more distantly, Qandil). But in the new situation emerging in Syria and the developments that may take place tomorrow in northern Iraq, Hüda-Par will be sent as missionaries to Syrian Kurdistan. The Kurdish people will again be drawn into the dominance of a radical Islam. To the extent that this orientation is successful, it will also have a very important impact on the Turkish side.
The fact that Turkey is entering the relatively protected area of the PYD/YPG will create a sense of trepidation, and the fear that the option of resisting the Erdoğan-Bahçeli paradigm will be at a great loss will strengthen the "Sunni Islam unity of cause" wing of the Kurdish movement (Öcalan, Demirtaş, DEM, etc.) over the opponents of this policy.
Sandstorms in Western Asia
Israel will press on
Following the October 7, 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood offensive by Hamas and its allies, Israel launched an all-out war against its enemies in Western Asia. When Iran did not respond to its repeated provocations toward all-out war, it methodically and deliberately set out to cut the wings of the Axis of Resistance one by one. It is shaking Hamas, its main target, by killing at least three of its central leaders (Haniyeh, Deif and Sinwar) and massacring civilians in what is clearly a slow-motion genocide. It has rendered Hezbollah immobile by assassinating its legendary leader and a number of other prominent cadres and bombing its territory for close to two months. Using this advantageous situation, it isolated Syria and had HTS/SNA deliver the final blow. This is a great success. In this situation, no one can stop Israel from fighting for even greater gains. Especially not Trump. Because Netanyahu and Trump share a hatred of Iran.
Following the fall of Assad, Trump has decided to apply what is known as "maximum pressure 2.0" against Iran, according to a report in the American Wall Street Journal. It is widely rumored that Trump or Netanyahu intend to aerially bombard Iran's nuclear power plants.
In such a situation, it is unthinkable that Iran will stay put. A full-scale war could ensue. But Iran is much weaker in this confrontation than before. The claim that Israel has destroyed Iran's air defense mechanisms is often reported in the imperialist press. On the other hand, Israel's technological superiority over Iran has been dramatically demonstrated in recent assassinations (even in the helicopter "crash" of President Reisi). In recent months, the Axis of Resistance forces have been repeatedly shaken, limiting Iran's ability to wage asymmetric warfare.
However, an Israel-Iran war may not occur immediately. The Zionist state's recent successes in isolating Iran may be prompting it to slyly plot against the other wings of the Axis of Resistance. The near future may witness an operation in Iraq or Yemen. The first missiles have already been fired at Yemen. As for Iraq, Israel's Iraqi ally Barzani and the loose cannon Muqtada al-Sadr need to be carefully scrutinized.
Henceforth it is Putin who may need Erdoğan
Russia's main goal in Syria in the coming period will be to preserve its naval base in Tartus and its air base in Khmeimim. Here, the support that Russia can count on the most can come from Erdoğan. Erdoğan is well aware that Putin may need him in the future. After all, he is on record to have said that he only got wind of the failed military coup of July 15 from his "brother-in-law." Putin, on the other hand, has been seriously deceived by Erdoğan and Fidan, who, in collusion with American and British imperialism, have been scheming to frustrate the Astana process, but he seems to have no better option than to swallow it and engage in a dialogue with Turkey. Therefore, Erdoğan can use his prestige with HTS to get Russia to keep its bases. However, even if this goes through, Putin will now be, in a sense, hostage to Erdoğan’s whims in Syria. He will know that if he makes an operation unacceptable to Turkey in, for instance, the African rivalry between the two countries or makes another misstep, he could lose his bases.
Hezbollah; the beginning of the end?
Life for Hezbollah is now doubly difficult: On the one hand, the great ally Syria has become an enemy; on the other hand, the short route for Iranian aid has been cut. It seems that from now on, only the sea route will be available. This will make aid both more expensive and time-consuming to arrive. The fact that Hezbollah provides services to an entire community (the Shia of Lebanon) will impede its swift dissolution. But HTS's name implies "Greater Syria." In other words, Syria's new strongmen aim to bring "liberation" to Lebanon as well. If Lebanon loses the protective cage of the Lebanese state, Hezbollah's social support could dwindle to a level incomparable to the present-day situation.
Iran between Scylla and Charybdis: war and disintegration
The progressive weakening of Iran as a consequence of the loss or decimation of many forces of the Axis of Resistance could also open the door to the collapse of the regime through the explosion of the social mobilization that has been building up for nearly a decade. When that stage approaches, the so-called "moderate" wing (like Assad's generals or a wing of the Soviet bureaucracy back in 1991) will be willing to cooperate and negotiate with imperialism. Especially in the "Jin, Jiyan, Azadi" rebellion, the pro-imperialist circles of the Iranian diaspora, managing to ally with the self-styled "Shah", tightened their ranks and succeeded in forming quite a powerful front. The fact that that rebellion defended women's emancipation, focusing mainly on the question of attire, gave the imperialist West an inbuilt advantage of being on the high moral ground. It does not seem impossible to witness the collapse of the Iranian regime in the wake of Syria's in a year or two.
China looks to its own problems
What concerns China the most in the Syrian downfall is not only the weakening of its close ally Iran, but also the fact that the soldiers of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) have assumed a tangible role in this process. Because it is clear that this force, estimated to wield between 2,000 and 5,000 fighters, could transfer its power to China's East Turkistan or Uyghur region tomorrow if it gains success in Syria. Therefore, China may try to follow a policy of isolating the TIP by getting along well with HTS. However, considering that HTS has appointed the leading commanders of this separatist organization to important positions in the military structure of the new era, it can be said that developments are not positive for China at all. The Turkistan Islamic Party, which the US removed from the list of terrorist organizations back in 2020, is still on Turkey's terror list. Just like HTS. And even before HTS has been removed from the list of terrorist organizations, not only Turkey but also states such as Britain, France and Germany started to establish diplomatic relations with this organization in daylight. These developments undoubtedly expand the room for maneuvering for the Turkistan Islamic Party and make it more difficult for China to isolate this organization.
Conclusion
The October 7, 2023 move by Hamas and its allies seems to have had the opposite of its intended result, as it was met with passive silence in the Arab world, both by the reactionary rulers of the states and, much more importantly, by the masses of the people (with some exceptional outbursts), at least for the time being. Israel's "slow-motion genocide" continues unabated thanks to the "democrats" of the imperialist camp, even social democrats and so-called progressive parties such as the Greens. This year the world will commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, far from learning lessons from that flare of barbarism, the world is watching with folded arms and mouths agape as this new genocide is unfolding.
Hamas has now been losing ground for a year and three months, with its people massacred in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority has not lifted a finger against the Emergency regime established in the West Bank. Hezbollah has lost much of its former legendary strength that drove Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 and crushed it on the battlefield in 2006 and, with the collapse of Syria, its future does not look bright. Baathist Syria is probably gone forever. Another power is rising against Iran: Syria's leadership is moving out of Iran's influence and into the hands of Erdoğan's Turkey, a NATO member. Apart from Iran, only groups such as Yemen's Ansarullah and Kataib Hezbollah within Iraq's Hashd al-Shaabi are left in the Axis of Resistance. Iran, on the other hand, seems to have regressed to some extent, even militarily, and is losing more and more of its people's support.
If Zionism and Trump cannot finish the job of an isolated Iran, the onus will be on Turkey. The widespread and systematic anti-Iranian sentiment in the Turkish media, viciously spread not only by political Islamist journalists but also by so-called "security experts" who are of military origin, and the efforts to legitimize a Sunni sectarian policy against Alawites and Shiites with concepts such as "political Alevism", which are obviously manufactured in the corridors of the intelligence apparatus, indicate that Turkey is being prepared for such a showdown. It is noteworthy that this theme, which had been systematically perpetrated by the Fethullah Gülen movement in the past, has become dominant again with different actors. The voices of the nationalist-Eurasianists and the like, who had gained a foothold on the extended spectrum of Erdoğan’s despotic regime in the aftermath of the July 15, 2016 failed coup and who advocated an alliance with Russia and Iran, are being muted. This course is extremely dangerous. No matter how much Iran is struggling with its internal problems, no matter how weakened its resistance axis is, it will not easily tolerate a harsh and hostile rivalry with Turkey. Rivalry can turn into enmity, and enmity into conflict much faster than expected. A war between two of the three great powers of the Middle East would result in even higher casualties than the Iran-Iraq war, which resulted in the death of a million soldiers and civilians on the two sides in eight years (1980-1988).
The new orientation, cooked up today by Erdoğan-Bahçeli-Öcalan, will bring Turkey gains (!) in the form of hundreds of thousands of deaths, perhaps more than a million, the collapse of the economy due to massive expenditures on the tracks of tanks and the artificial intelligence of drones, and unchained militarism.
The only force in Turkey that can stand against the seemingly unstoppable aggressive expansionism of the Erdoğan-Bahçeli coalition and the hysterical excitement it creates within the country is proletarian socialism. The CHP, the main bourgeois opposition party, has already surrendered to the Erdoğan- Bahçeli-Öcalan line. The first signs of this surrender were given immediately after the local elections with Özgür Özel's statement to the effect "we are the opposition domestically and Turkey's party in foreign affairs". At this stage, the CHP is in no position to say anything other than "respect for the memory of our martyrs" opportunism and "send the Syrians back" because the only objection it had to the so-called “solution process” of 2013-2015 was that parliament ought to be the authority that should wield the power to solve this issue. That objection has now been taken away from it this time, for negotiations are focused within parliament this time around.
The essence of the matter is this: The bourgeoisie is palpably content with the influence gained over Syria and the expansionist opportunities that will follow, so it is not possible for the CHP to seriously oppose this process, save episodic manoeuvers. Moreover, the DEM Party, which was its ally in the last elections, has become a front-row active element of the negotiation process this time.
The initiative of the DEM Party is very insignificant in the development of the process. Apart from Öcalan, neither Demirtaş nor the DEM Party can take the initiative in determining the future, and even if they did, it would have no effect. The only other effective actor can be the PKK leadership nestled on the Qandil mountain. For the time being, it has remained silent.
All the forces that were on the side of the established order have become pro-Second Republic! Compared to Özal's isolation 30 years ago, this clearly shows how much Turkey has changed. Most importantly, there is not the slightest crack from the TSK.
It is futile to look for any way out within the politics of the established order. The only way out can be found through class politics. In this context, the mobilization that started in different sections of the working class towards the end of 2024 has reached a new point, with the first gains in Perfetti Van Melle and Polonez at the very beginning of 2025. The strikes in various metallurgical factories affiliated with the United Metallurgical Union, carried on courageously despite the strike ban imposed by a decree of Erdoğan, form the background to this. Strikes and resistances continue in many other factories.
This is the road to follow. All other paths are closed. If there is a qualitative leap in the struggles of the working class, the minimum-wage workers lined up in their millions, bitterly resentful of the conditions deemed appropriate for them, the civil servants and pensioners faced with disgraceful salary increases, the farmers whose costs make it impossible for them to survive, the whole world of the poor will line up behind that working class. Alevis, women and youth are looking for a way out. The path is clear. The important thing is to weave this path.
The struggle to make Turkey the center, not of reaction, but of the struggle of the exploited and oppressed in Western Asia needs to tread along such a difficult but solid path.
Revolutionary Workers' Party