The events that occurred in Damascus on December 8, 2024, are of historical importance, at least for Western Asia (the Middle East). It is essential to calmly assess the emerging situation and build predictions on this serene evaluation regarding how the objective conditions will develop from now on and what kind of policies should be followed by proletarian socialism. This article provides an initial evaluation of concrete developments. This should be followed by determinations regarding the development dynamics of the emerging new situation and the policies to be followed by proletarian socialism.
1. With the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, Ba'athism, which represented a historically significant advancement in Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria) and Mesopotamia, has passed into history. The imperialist invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the civil war fought under imperialist control in Syria between 2012 and 2024 destroyed the two main strongholds of Ba'athism in Western Asia, which showed some significant differences between them. From now on, even if there is a new rise partly based on the old cadres and ideology, it would be more accurate to call it "basubadelmevt" (resurrection after death) rather than calling it Baathism. Furthermore, this probability is very low. From now on, the task in Western Asia will fall to proletarian socialism, not Ba'athism, which was a step forward in the bourgeois revolution in the Arab world.
2. Ba'athism is actually a vein within the general current of Nasserism. The Arab National Revolution, which made its appearance in history with the Egyptian revolution that took place between 1952 and 1954, where it made its greatest advances, dissolved early (during the governments of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mobarak after Nasser’s death in 1970) and collapsed in Libya (beyond the previous signs of partial degeneration) after the regional and tribal war of 2011. With the collapse of Ba'athism, which was already rotting from within, the Arab National Revolution came to an end in the entire Arab world (formally, but only formally, except in one country, namely Algeria). Despite all the decadence it experienced, the benefits that this revolution had brought to the Arab world (republic, partial secularism, agrarian reform in some countries, and some emancipation of women’s conditions) still continued partially. Now, the influence of political Islam will increase, secularism and women's freedoms will be affected, and Arab geography, especially Syria, will likely experience a process of fragmentation. Iraq may undergo, somewhat later, a similar process. The future of Christians, Alawite Arabs, Druze, and other minority peoples faces great threats.
3. The true measure of how some so-called Marxist groups, which have been spreading the dream of a revolution in Syria since the beginning of the civil war, have deceived the world will now become clear after the civil war has been won by the more reactionary side. Unmasking the groups that conjured revolution out of thin air is one of the important tasks of the coming period. On the other hand, the widespread contrary opinion in Turkey and elsewhere must be strictly rejected. Many try to tarnish the name of the true revolutions that took place between 2011-2013 and in 2019, presenting the collapse of the Syrian regime due to the attack by a takfiri mob as an extension of the "Arab Revolution" or, in the same sense, the "Arab Spring." The relationship between the two events is restricted to the fact that they occurred in the same period and therefore influenced each other. Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Sudan, or Algeria experienced true revolutionary processes, but despite some partial victories, the revolution was unable to achieve a decisive victory and was eventually defeated. Libya was never a revolution from the beginning; Syria, on the other hand, ceased to be a revolution very quickly. Both occurred as reactionary civil wars between factions of the ruling class. Approaches that attempt to establish an identity between the "Arab Revolution" and the imperialist project called the "Greater Middle East" are anti-Marxist and incapable of recognizing revolution when they see it.
4. What could be the direct reasons for the collapse in Syria? How can it be explained that the state surrendered in two weeks, almost without firing a shot, in a country that had calmed down after the reconquest of Aleppo by Assad's forces in 2016 and where events led to the widespread belief that Assad had won? The news from Syria makes us think that the Ba'ath regime had completely lost the economic vitality it once experienced under the government of the Sunni bourgeoisie of Aleppo. Having been subjected to a civil war, all social life has been shaken, with a population of more than five million becoming refugees outside the country, and corruption devouring the state like cancer. In other words, the internal decay of the regime seems to have had a significant impact on the end of the civil war with the collapse of the Ba'ath regime. The fundamental facts on this subject will only emerge over time.
5. Beyond Syria’s internal dynamics, the most important reasons for the surrender of the national army and the collapse of the regime arose from international conditions. The first of these is that Israel transformed the low-intensity war with Hezbollah, which had been going on since October 7, 2023, into an all-out war starting on October 1 of this year, after killing Nasrallah at the end of September, paralyzing the organization with the great damage caused. Of course, Hezbollah is still standing, not collapsed, but its current situation is not adequate to defend Syria. Hezbollah’s defence of Assad’s regime, if it had the power, is in fact closely linked to its own interests. All of Iran’s assistance, whether weapons or troops, reaches Lebanon mainly through Syria. In other words, the destruction of Syria was an event that cast a shadow on Hezbollah's own future. Despite knowing this, Hezbollah had to refrain from engaging in combat against HTS and SMO forces. A decisive factor in this case is the astonishing speed of the Ba'ath regime’s collapse in Syria. If the Syrian army had resisted the takfiri attack for some time, there is evidence that Hezbollah and other allied forces were preparing to send reinforcements. However, the speed of the defeat did not allow for such a manoeuvre.
6. The role played by Hezbollah's paralysis caused by the Israeli assault in Assad’s overthrow is very important, but some events suggest that Israel’s role may have been even broader. The most important of these events is that the HTS/SMO offensive began immediately on the day the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah came into effect. The ceasefire meant the cessation of military activity by Israel in Lebanon and the liberation of its forces. On the other hand, it also restricted Hezbollah. If Hezbollah had reacted to HTS's action and sent troops to Syria to protect Assad, as it did in the early stages of the civil war, it would have been trapped between two fires. The fact that HTS’s attack coincided with that day may be directly due to Hezbollah being trapped in this way. What is not clear is whether HTS launched the attack immediately to take advantage of this situation or whether it had pre-planned coordination with Israel. As we will see shortly, there are clear indications that HTS had been planning and preparing this attack for a long time (over a six-month period, or, according to some sources, even at least a year). The question is whether these preparations were made in coordination with Israel or even with its encouragement and provocation.
7. The second most important factor is the bankruptcy of Russia's policy in Syria. The fact that the Putin administration was unable to save the regime and could only help Assad escape to safety and give him asylum is a humiliating defeat for Russia. To prevent this civil war from ending like this, Russia deployed military forces in Syria in 2015 and made a significant contribution to protecting the regime through airstrikes and military activities carried out by the Wagner military company on the ground. The enormous economic costs, human casualties, and political prestige accumulated over more than nine years have been squandered. The Russian consul general in Istanbul expressed the failure of the Astana process in diplomatic language as "the failure of the process." From now on, the countries that supported Russia, believing it to be a counterbalance to imperialism in the Arab world, the Mediterranean, and Africa, will no longer be able to trust Russia as before. The naval base in Tartus and the air base in Hmeymim, near Latakia, are already under threat. Their loss would be a heavy blow to Mediterranean and African policy. The dream of replacing these bases by those in Libya due to the vast distance separating them from Russia is far from realistic. Behind this great defeat of Russia Western media have pointed to the fact that the war in Ukraine has drawn all the country's attention. However, the assassination of its chief Prigozhin after the Wagner rebellion and the blow to this important centre of private military service also severely shook Russia in Syria.
8. The third major factor is that Iran simply had to recoil and look after its own narrow interests. Israel attempted twice to provoke Iran into starting a war but was unsuccessful. Iran (also taking into consideration the US threat to defend Israel) did not dare or did not see the need to go to war with the only nuclear power in Western Asia. The leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah are not the only ones in the series of assassinations that began with Qasem Soleimani during the Trump era and continued with Israel’s participation during the Biden era. Iran’s elite commanders, especially those guiding Hezbollah, have been assassinated one after another. In other words, there is a weakening of Iran's operational power on the ground. Imperialist media continue to say that Iran has spent 30 billion dollars in Syria since 2011. Although this figure, whose source is not specified, is probably exaggerated, there is no doubt that the activity carried out during this period has cost Iran dear, not only economically but also politically. Additionally, with Assad's fall, Iran not only saw the Syrian regime, which was central to the "Axis of Resistance", collapse, but also lost the most secure, shortest, and economical route for all kinds of assistance to Hezbollah.
9. Last but certainly not the least is the policy pursued by Turkey. Erdoğan’s government has benefited from this development to the point that it has been described by imperialist media as “the most powerful external actor in Syria, with military presence on the ground and access to the leaders of the rebels” (Reuters). Reuters claimed (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-syria-rebels-stars-aligned-assads-ouster-2024-12-08/), based on two anonymous sources, that the Turkish government had been aware of plans and preparations for this event for months,. The event that set the process in motion here seems to have been Assad's refusal to reconcile with Turkey under the conditions of that day. Erdoğan's approach of “let’s reunite together with our families” towards Assad at the end of June was rejected. Or rather, more precisely, it was conditioned on Turkey withdrawing its troops from Syrian territory. Then, in mid-August, the Turkish Minister of Defence Yaşar Güler advanced as conditions for negotiations between the two countries “a new constitution, elections, and the establishment of border security”. In a way, these conditions imply telling Assad: “You go, and then we’ll sit down at the table.” According to the Reuters report, at this stage, HTS considered it right to disclose the preparations made to Turkey. It is also added that the Turkish army was also aware of the preparations. In fact, HTS could not have notified Turkey at the last minute when starting the operation because, in that case, the coordination and division of labour between HTS and SMO would not have been achieved with such precision.
10. If the reporting by Reuters is correct (including the timeline) in the broader sense, then it will be easier to understand why Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the fascist party and Erdoğan’s staunch ally since 2015, gave the red carpet to Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK who has been imprisoned since 1999. Yaşar Güler, the Turkish defence minister, delivered his speech concerning Syria referred to above in mid-August, saying “we won’t talk until the regime is overthrown.” It is said that HTS disclosed its plans to Turkey at this stage. If 15 days is a reasonable time frame, we arrive at early September. After Erdoğan, Bahçeli, and other authorities dedicated September to planning the future course, the plan was put into action on the day of the parliament's opening, October 1. Everything is very consistent. So, why was this plan necessary? Because in Syria, there exist not only the armed forces of HTS, derivative of Al Qaeda, and SMO, whose payroll is registered in Turkey’s public finances. Alongside some other takfiri armed forces, there is also the YPG, the armed forces of Syrian Kurds and their political allies, who receive support from the United States and have been strengthened with weapons and money from that source. If Öcalan convinces the YPG to join the Turkish army in the "cause of Sunni Islam," this will strengthen the military capacity of the alliance between Erdoğan and Bahçeli’s fascists will be raised to a new power. Otherwise, the possibility of a series of conflicts and contradictions will make the plan riskier. In more general terms, the possibility of the collapse of the Syrian regime on the horizon triggered the expansionist impulses of the alliance between Erdoğan and the fascists ruling Turkey. Of course, we are not saying that the negotiations with Öcalan started in September. It is evident that such conversations must have been going on for many years or at least months. What we are saying is that the transition from the plan to implementation fits perfectly into this scenario.
11. If this framework is correct, the fate of Rojava (the Kurdish entity in Syria, although nowadays the official appellation is the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria) in the new situation in Syria will depend on how the Kurdish movement in Turkey responds to the offer made to it by the alliance that governs Turkey, rather than being determined militarily there. It is clear that the new situation will strengthen those within the Kurdish movement who defend the vision of "Sunni Islamic unity" with the Turkish government. However, it seems that the talks are currently stalled. Time will tell if this deadlock can be overcome in light of the new circumstances that have emerged in Syria.
12. Let us leave the question of what are the potential dynamics of the near future to another article and focus on one last possibility. If HTS had indeed been planning a new offensive for months, what drove it to consider changing the status quo established since 2016 and restart the civil war after eight years? We mentioned one possibility above: while planning an operation that would paralyze Hezbollah, it is possible that Israel considered that this kind of paralysis would strengthen the hand of HTS as never before and suggested to it that if an attempt were made to overthrow Assad, the attack might succeed, given the situation of Hezbollah and Russia. We can take this a step further. If the Reuters report is true, the plan may have led to an even larger international alliance after HTS informed Turkey a little later and reached an agreement with it. In fact, due to the ever alive mutual cooperation between Israel and the United States, it is highly probable that the United States was indeed involved. Some oddities about Amos Hochstein, the special envoy Biden sent to Lebanon to mediate between Israel and Hezbollah, lose their strangeness in this scenario. On the one hand, Hochstein was sent to Lebanon on August 21, long before the war escalated and even before Nasrallah was killed on September 27. (https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1348017/hochstein-in-beirut-all-you-need-to-know.html) The reason for his visit was said to be negotiations over the maritime border between the two countries, which had last been discussed in 2022. This is a strange justification for sending a special envoy at a time when there was much greater tension between the two parties and an outbreak of large-scale war was only a matter of time, giving the impression of an attempt to cover up another purpose. An event that strengthens this scenario occurred after the war began, before the ceasefire was signed: while Israel had bombed the south of the country and of Beirut, dominated by Shiites and Hezbollah, since October 1, at the moment when Israel began bombing the very centre of the capital, Beirut, Hochstein initiated new negotiations and told the press that "the ceasefire is now very close." (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/19/us-envoy-amos-hochstein-arrives-in-lebanon-for-ceasefire-talks) This was probably because some conditions had already been met. An attack on the very centre of a country's capital brings ceasefire on the agenda! There are many reasons to think that this was Israel participating in an escalation in coordination with Hochstein to leave Hezbollah helpless and agree to a ceasefire. These may be true or not. But it cannot be said that the scenario where HTS's attack, planned for months, could have taken place with the knowledge of the U.S.-Israel-Turkey triangle, or even with their planning, is impossible.
A very striking new situation has arisen in Western Asia. In the face of this new setup, internationalist proletarian politics is of a burning importance. This task is the duty of socialists of all nations.